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RECAP: Montana Cannabis Industry Association v. State: What is
the Scope of Rational Basis Review in Montana?
Luc Brodhead
No. DA 15-0055 Montana Supreme Court
Oral Argument: Wednesday, November 4, 2015 at 9:30 AM in the
Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek Justice
Building, Helena, Montana.
II. STUART SEGREST FOR APPELLANT
The Court’s questions for Mr. Segrest focused on his perception
of the Montana Marijuana Act’s (MMA) legislative purpose.
Specifically, the Court was interested in the significance of federal
illegality as a legitimate legislative purpose. The Court also delved into
the question of whether the MMA was designed to provide legal access
to medical treatment or merely provides limited legal protection from
prosecution.
Justice Mike Wheat jumped in to question the significance of
federal illegality as a legislative purpose given the federal government’s
current deference to state medical marijuana and recreational use laws. In
response, Mr. Segrest reasserted the central argument from his briefs that
rational basis inquiry is limited to those concerns the Legislature had at
the time of passing the act, pointing out that the federal government’s
deference has increased since 2011, after the MMA’s passage.
Furthermore, Mr. Segrest observed that, back in 2011, the
federal government had given the Legislature reasons to be concerned
about federal illegality, noting that, in 2009, the federal government had
distributed the Ogden Memorandum, which gave federal prosecutors
discretion to prosecute marijuana offenses if they found that a state did
not sufficiently regulate access. He also pointed out that the federal
government raided Montana medical marijuana providers while the
Legislature was deliberating in 2011. He ultimately relied on Gonzolas v.
Raich,1 which held that the Controlled Substances Act remains supreme
over conflicting state laws. However, Mr. Segrest did concede that under
the current federal policy and the current form of the MMA, federal
prosecutors would probably not pursue charges in Montana.
Justice Mckinnon questioned the legitimacy of federal illegality
as justification for the commercial ban when the remainder of the MMA
also violates federal law. Mr. Segrest responded that the commercial
market, in particular, created tension with federal law, especially
1

545 U.S. 1, 29 (2005).
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considering the exponential growth of commercial sales in Montana
between 2009 and 2011. He noted that the Legislature was particularly
concerned with the criminal liability of state employees for aiding and
abetting in those commercial sales.
Justice Mckinnon then asked about Mr. Segrest’s position on the
actual legislative purpose of the MMA, something she viewed as the
underlying disagreement between the parties. Mr. Segrest asserted that
the legislative purpose was to create a limited affirmative defense to
prosecution, not to make medical marijuana a legal form of medical
treatment. To support this, he pointed to the record of the Legislature’s
concern with abuses arising from the prior medical marijuana law,
indicating intent to curb abuses by creating a more limited degree of
legality.
Justice Shea then pointing out that these kinds of abuses could
also seemingly justify a commercial ban of dangerous prescription
medication. To make his point, he asked Mr. Segrest whether such a
restriction on prescription medication would satisfy rational basis. Mr.
Segrest countered that prescription drugs would require a different type
of analysis. He asserted that they are not illegal federally, that they are
available via prescription (versus “certification” under the MMA), and
that they are more regularly used than medical marijuana.
Justice Baker took the discussion in another direction by
pointing out that when the provisions within the commercial ban are
separately analyzed, they lack a strong rational basis. She observed that,
assuming the Legislature was concerned with large-scale production,
banning remuneration to providers lacks a rational basis because the
three-patient limit for providers and other limitations in the MMA
already achieve that purpose. Mr. Segrest responded with his position on
the scope of rational basis review, asserting that to even ask about the
necessity of both provisions is irrelevant to rational basis inquiry. He
relied on Rohlfs v. Klemenhagen,2 where the Court held that weighing the
necessity of a law or evaluating the quality of the Legislature’s
justification for a law exceeds the scope of rational basis review.
II. JAMES GOETZ FOR APPELLEE
The justices initially focused their questions to Mr. Goetz on his
perception of the legislative purpose of the MMA. They also touched
specifically on the district court’s treatment of the 25-patient physician
review trigger and the probationer ban.
Before, these questions came up, Mr. Goetz opened by
addressing the vitality of rational basis review in Montana and the
burden shifting that must occur. He asserted that the party challenging
2

227 P.3d 42, 48 (Mont. 2009).
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constitutionality has the burden of showing that the provision treats
similarly situated persons differently; then, the government has the
burden of showing a legitimate state objective and showing that the law
rationally relates to that objective. He further argued that under Cotrill v.
Cotrill Sodding Service,3 the state must meet a more restrictive standard
of review than under federal law. He added that under Brewer v. SkiLift,4 the Court may also consider the overbreadth of a statute in
determining whether it satisfies rational basis. In other words, he argues
that the Court may consider whether the statute is the least restrictive
means of achieving the stated purpose.
Justice Baker redirected Mr. Goetz back towards Legislature’s
purpose for passing the MMA, specifically whether it was to provide
legal medical care or to merely give cardholders legal protection. Mr.
Goetz argued that this was not a helpful distinction, and he characterized
the actual legislative purpose of the act as allowing access to marijuana
to those who require it. He added that a secondary purpose of the act was
to curb the perceived abuses of the prior medical marijuana law.
Having heard, Mr. Goetz’s perception of the legislative purpose,
Justice Shea put it to the test by asking how the 25-patient review trigger
was not rationally related to the objective of preventing certification
abuses. Mr. Goetz pointed out that, while the provision was perhaps
rationally related to curbing abuses, it also had a chilling effect on
doctors’ willingness to certify cardholders and thus limited the more
central legislative purpose of providing access to marijuana.
Chief Justice McGrath then addressed Mr. Goetz’s facial
challenge to the probationer ban and asked whether probationer access
would be better challenged on a case-by-case basis. Mr. Goetz clarified
that he agrees that probationer access should be determined on a case-bycase basis, but he argued that the probationer ban precludes this type of
determination because, on its face, it is a blanket ban. He argued that,
pursuant to State v. Ashby,5 the ban should only apply when a reasonable
nexus exists between restricting access to medical marijuana and the
probationer’s underlying offense. Thus, the ban should be struck down
for being facially unconstitutional.
III. MR. SEGREST’S REBUTTAL
Mr. Segrest first addressed Mr. Goetz’s contention that the Court
may consider whether the provisions at issue are the least restrictive
means for achieving the Legislature’s purpose. Mr. Segrest argued that,
under rational basis review, no court should inquire into a law’s tailoring
or breadth. He distinguished this case from Brewer by pointing out that
744 P.2d 895 (Mont. 1987).
762 P.2d 226 (Mont. 1988).
5
179 P.3d 1164 (Mont. 2008).
3
4
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the legislative interest in that case was much less compelling that it was
here, meaning that the Court had more discretion to consider the law’s
breadth.
Mr. Segrest then addressed Mr. Goetz’s characterization of the
MMA’s legislative purpose. He initially conceded that part of the law’s
purpose was to provide limited access to marijuana but emphasized that
access does not equate to commercial access. Backing up from this, he
argued that the central purpose of the act was to curb abuses of the prior
law and to address federal illegality, reminding the Court that the federal
government was particularly concerned with Montana’s commercial
market.
Justice Shea then asked what the rational basis for the
commercial ban would be if the Court were to uphold the remainder of
the MMA. In response, Mr. Segrest stuck to his guns and argued that,
even if the other provisions address the same purpose as the commercial
ban, it is not the Court’s job to review the necessity of the provisions,
even when they have the same effect.
IV. PREDICTIONS
As already indicated, the Court’s primary interest in this
argument was the legislative purpose behind the MMA. Justice
McKinnon in particular described this as the critical underlying dispute
between the parties and insisted that both lawyers state their positions on
the subject. Mr. Segrest relied heavily on avoidance of federal illegality
as justification for the act, but the justices consistently questioned and
took apart that idea. By Mr. Segrest’s rebuttal, he had made the
important concession that access to marijuana was, in fact, part of the
MMA’s underlying purpose, albeit limited and noncommercial access.
Mr. Goetz took the predictable position that providing access to
marijuana was the main purpose of the act, acknowledging that curbing
abuses was also a legislative concern. The justices did not take much
time unpacking and questioning Mr. Goetz’s argument, but it was still
not obvious whether that signaled approval or disapproval of his
position.
In its questions, the Court revealed concern over the district
court’s invalidation of the 25-patient physician review trigger. Both
Justice Shea and Baker suggested in their questioning of Mr. Goetz that
the Legislature had a legitimate purpose in controlling the standard of
care for certifying doctors and that the provision seemed rationally
related to that objective. Importantly, Mr. Goetz never denied that point.
He only could make the unconvincing argument that the provision was
still contrary to the purpose of providing access to marijuana.
The Court revealed a degree of support for the district court’s
invalidation of the commercial ban and suggested that they may uphold
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that decision at least in part. As already mentioned, multiple justices
questioned the significance of federal illegality as a justification for the
MMA, and the justices’ doubt arose specifically in the context of the
commercial ban. If the justices do doubt the significance of federal
illegality, then the State loses ground on its principle argument that the
commercial ban is justified by that concern.
Justice Shea attacked the rational basis of the commercial ban by
repeatedly comparing it to a commercial ban on pharmaceutical drugs.
His focus on this point potentially reveals a belief that the Legislature
arbitrarily chose to ban the commercial sale of marijuana and could as
easily justified a ban on the sale of prescription drugs.
Justice Shea also revealed his doubts about the rational basis of
the commercial ban when viewed in the context of the remaining
provisions. As mentioned above, Mr. Segrest responded with his central
argument that such an inquiry goes to the necessity of the provision in
light of the act’s other provisions and thus exceeded the scope of rational
basis review.
It is important to note that Justices Shea, McGrath, Wheat, and
Baker asked questions seemingly contradictory Mr. Segrest’s position on
the scope of rational basis review. He relied throughout the argument on
the principle of a limited and deferential form of rational basis review.
He asserted that rational basis does not depend on a provision’s necessity
in light of other provisions or in light of its current circumstances, nor
does it depend on the provision’s overbreadth in addressing the
Legislature’s objective.
However, the justices persisted in asking questions that
implicated those exact concerns. Justice Wheat questioned the
significance of avoiding federal illegality when the federal government
has increasingly deferred to state law since 2011. Justice Baker and
Justice Shea questioned the rational basis of the commercial ban by
considering its necessity in light of other provisions. Justice Shea also
questioned the Legislature’s reasoning for the commercial ban by
comparing it to a commercial ban on prescription drugs. All of these
lines of questioning point towards a less deferential version of rational
basis review than what the State has argued. That does not mean
conclusively that the Court will permanently invalidate the commercial
ban, but it suggests that they may be willing to review it in a manner
consistent with the district court’s approach.

